The editor of this text has brought together fifteen selections representing some of the major contributions philosophers have made to the study of the aims of education. This anthology is organized into three parts: classical, modern and analytic philosophies of education. Each selection is preceded by the editor’s one page introduction, which unfortunately is far too short to prepare the student to deal technically with the material. In the part devoted to classical writings on education, texts from Plato and (...) class='Hi'>Aristotle are offered with no regard to the cultural setting, while the excerpts from Locke, Rousseau and Kant seem to be presented principally with a concern for moral education. The five modern selections are far more interesting, particularly those from Dewey and Russell. The material from Maritain and Whitehead is preponderantly practical, though Sidney Hook’s defense of Dewey will afford the student an appreciation of careful argument. By far the most engaging part of the book is the last, comprising significant selections from Scheffler, Ryle and Jane Roland Martin. A portion of R. S. Peters’ Authority, Responsibility and Education is reprinted, but surprisingly enough, Peters’ far better book, Ethics and Education, is neglected. Cahn presents a short essay of his own, "Is There an Analytic Philosophy of Education?" which he probably would have modified had he been acquainted with Peters’ recent work. The likely use of this anthology is the teacher education course commonly referred to coincidentally by the same title. It is to Cahn’s credit that he has attempted to expose the education student to genuine philosophy, yet this anthology presents a mere mass of material without an effort at providing direction, structure or synthesis. The serious philosophical work of systematically analyzing education, culture, self and meaning still remains as much a task as it did before, though now thanks to Cahn some of the working materials for such an endeavor have been made more available.—J. T. K. (shrink)

The papers published here were given at the second biennial conference of the Hegel Society of America, held at the University of Notre Dame, November 9-11, 1972. They appear in an order which reflects roughly two headings: (1) Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy in general, and (2) his relation to individual thinkers both before and after him. Given the importance of the history of philosophy for Hegel, and the far-reaching impact of his thought upon subsequent philosophy, it becomes (...) immediately apparent that we have here only a beginning. At the conference, cries went up "Why not Hegel and Aristotle, Aquinas, HusserI and Hart mann?" Indeed, why not? The answer, of course, might be given by Hegel himself : if we wish to accomplish anything, we have to limit ourselves. We trust that future conferences and scholarship will bring to light these relationships and the many more which testify to Hegel's profound presence in the mainstream of past and present thought. It is furthermore no accident that the renaissance of Hegelian studies has brought with it a rebirth of the history of philosophy as something relevant to our own problems. For Hegel, the object of philosophy is alone the truth, the history of philosophy is philosophy itself, and this truth which it gives us cannot be what has passed away. (shrink)

When Pythodorus in 411 B.C. moved in the Athenian Assembly his decree that Commissioners should be elected to draft measures for the security of the State, Cleitophon added a rider instructing the Commissioners προσαναξητσαι κα τος πατρονς νμονς ος κλειδθνης θηκεν τε καθδτη τν δημοκραταν, πως ν κοσαντες κα τοτων βολεσωντααι τ ριστον. The instruction appears to have struck Aristotle as paradoxical and inept, for he has appended an explanation of Cleitophon's reasons which is also a criticism: ς ο (...) δημοτικν λλ παραπλησαν οσαν τν Kλεισθνους πολιτεαν τ Σλωνος. Indeed one would never imagine that the constitution of Cleisthenes as described by Aristotle could have been seriously suggested as a model or a repertory of precedents for legislators intent, like Cleitophon's friends, on restoring the πτριος πολιτεα, which it obviously disestablished; and the conjunction of τοĐς πατρουσ with τε καθστη τν δημοκραταν might seem to make the proposal a challenge or a mockery. Aristotle had already given his opinion that by Cleisthenes' innovations δημοτικωτρα πολĐ τς Σλωνος γνετο πολιτεα He recognized democratic features in Solon's laws, but they lay in the redress of social wrongs or in the method of administering justice rather than in the organization of the government; he regarded Solon's political changes, not as the establishment of democracy proper, but as a reform, conservative rather than revolutionary, of existent institutions. His comment on the rider implies that he would not have corrected Cleitophon if he had referred the Commissioners to Solon's ancestral laws, but to refer them to Cleisthenes' must, he thought, be ignorance, irony, or idiosyncrasy. (shrink)

The volume presents essays on the philosophical explanation of the relationship between body and soul in antiquity from the Presocratics to Galen. The title of the volume alludes to a phrase found in Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, referring to aspects of living behaviour involving both body and soul, and is a commonplace in ancient philosophy, dealt with in very different ways by different authors.

κάτοπτρον, which is in all the manuscripts, was emended by Canter to κάτοπτον, and this emendation, or Headlam's κατόπτην, has been received by subsequent editors. Those who read κάτοπτον have been in the habit of taking the word to mean here ‘looking down upon’, and in support of this interpretation they sometimes adduce a scholium in M, κατόψιον. This does seem to prove that the scholar, whose note is copied in our scholium, found κάτοπτον in his text. Presumably he took (...) Σαρωνικο πορθμο κάτοπτον to signify ‘descried from the Saronic gulf’, having very possibly in his mind the phrase in Euripides, Hippolytus 30, where the temple of Cypris is said to be κατόψιον γς τσδε, visible from Troezen. At least we ought not without proof to lay to his account what appears to be the solecism of regarding κάτοπτον as if it meant ‘looking down upon’. Headlam's κατόπτην has at least an active force, but I cannot find that it means ‘one who looks down upon’, if that is the sense desired; it is a ‘spy’ or an ‘inspector’. And, at the end of all discussion, when one asks what in fact is this peak or headland that ‘looks down upon the Saronic crossing’, then commentators take refuge in silence or tend to contradict one another. An emendation that nobody can be sure he understands can hardly be regarded as satisfactory. It may be feared that what has happened is this. In order to get rid of κάτοπτρον, which appeared to them devoid of meaning, editors have introduced into the text a word which does not mean what they want it to mean, and which, if it had that meaning, would still present us with a picture which no man can recognize. (shrink)

A general survey with selections of the original texts taken from existing translations: the Pre-Socratics from Kirk and Raven, Plato mainly from Cornford, and Aristotle from the Harvard University Press translations. The emphasis is on metaphysics and epistemology rather than on other branches of philosophy.—J. K.

Two putative functions of emotion experience — its roles in intentional action and in social understanding — were investigated using a group of individuals (repressors) known to have impaired anxiety experience. Repressors, low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious individuals were asked to give a public presentation, and then given the opportunity to avoid the presentation. Repressors were the group most likely to avoid giving the presentation, but were the least likely to give an emotional explanation for their avoidance. By contrast, they (...) were not less likely than other groups to provide negative emotional explanations of another person’s behaviour in a film clip. We concluded that: (1) repressors are impaired in self- but not in other-explanation using emotion, implying that “simulation” is not the method used by repressors to ground their folk psychology, (2) the intentional avoidance shown by repressors is indicative of some intact first-order phenomenal anxiety experience but that they lack second-order awareness of this anxiety experience. (shrink)

IN THE beginning Parmenides sought to deny the void. But he found himself trapped by his language and his thought into admitting what he sought to deny. Wisely, he counseled others to avoid the whole region in which the problem arises, lest they too be unwarily ensnared. Plato, being less easily intimidated and grasping for the first time the urgency of the paradox, unearthed each snare in turn until he felt he had found a safe path through the forbidden terrain (...) in a new conception of being and the derivation of its linguistic consequences in the Sophist. Aristotle evidently took Parmenides’ advice; and save for a few groping scholastics, perhaps Leibniz, Brentano, and Meinong, and Frege only in passing, no one else attempted the crossing before Russell made his spectacular dash through the posted ground from the completely new direction of linguistic reference. Again the problem lay dormant for half a century until Strawson constructed a new low road through ordinary language and Quine improved Russell’s high algebraic pass. Refinements of these routes have been forthcoming, especially from Searle and Kripke, until today it might appear that there are two super highways through Parmenides’ forbidden country of nonbeing. In this essay I will first argue that these new linguistic highways are no more than flimsy camouflage hiding but not resolving the old paradoxes. I will then show how Plato’s ontological way out, though more difficult, is the straight and narrow path. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal ExpressionSarah K. Burgess and Stuart J. MurrayFor More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression. Adriana Cavarero. Trans. Paul A. Kottman. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. Pp. 262. $65.00, hardcover; $24.95, paperback.Adriana Cavarero's most recent book, For More than One Voice, offers the reader a critique of Western metaphysics that challenges the hegemony of speech's relation (...) to thought within politics. Revisiting Aristotle's Politics, Cavarero examines the famous definition of man as "zoon logon echon"—usually translated as "rational animal." She is critical of the tradition that renders logos here as "reason" or "rationality," modeled on the abstract and disembodied Platonic idea. Reading the Politics alongside the Poetics, she brings politics into a distinctly rhetorical sphere, and therefore figures logos as "phone semantike." In this light, man is a "speaking animal," an animal who speaks with a voice (phone) that is meaningful (semantike—an adjectival form that qualifies the voice itself). Cavarero's argument is that voice and meaning—phonic and semantic—must be sharply distinguished. The history of Western philosophy, she contends, has effaced this vital difference and focused instead on speech as a unitary phenomenon in which the vocalic and the semantic are always already joined as meaningful signification. In this way, the singularity of the vocalic itself has been elided in favor of speech that strongly privileges meaning. She therefore wishes to deliver us from language, as it were, through a recuperation of the force of the vocalic, the acoustic, the resonant and sonorous auditory quality of phone.Absent in the history of Western philosophy, this sonorous aspect of the vocalic stands as a corrective to our logocentric metaphysical tradition that singularly values the visual over the acoustic, semantic content over vocal utterances, and an abstract, anonymous "what" over a particular, embodied "who." Cavarero claims that the vocalic is an "anti-metaphysical" force that exceeds and challenges signification. In other words, the vocalic immediately communicates the uniqueness of the speaker without recourse to the signifying content of his or her speech. The voice is essentially relational—a relation that is described as "the condition of every communication.... the communicability of the communicable, or the significance of signification" (29). Indeed, for Cavarero the voice is that which "precedes, generates, and exceeds verbal communication" [End Page 166] (29–30). In this way, remarkably, Cavarero refigures the voice as a presymbolic origin that is both temporally and ontologically prior to signification, as that which is a condition of possibility for signification, and as that which is never exhausted by any signifying speech act as such.The voice is the expression of one unique, embodied individual to another. This expression, a "reciprocal invocation" founded in the sonorous, rhythmic, and resonant materiality of the voice, constitutes a "duet," a musical exchange of voices in and through which individuals mutually invoke one another. Cavarero resists inscribing such a relation within the symbolic realm; yet for her this relation is a "wordless language" that takes place in the paradigmatic scene between mother and infant. Here, in this originary scene, there is not yet the movement of language or speech as such, but the rhythm and cadence of demand and response—the voices of mother and infant that invoke one another. Drawing on Hélène Cixous's and Julia Kristeva's well-known work on the maternal chora, Cavarero demonstrates that the cadence of the "la-la melody" exchanged between mother and infant "configure[s] a reciprocal dependence" (170) that takes a structural form in the movement between demand and response.For Cavarero, the "scene of infancy" enjoys a primacy: it is both ontologically and chronologically prior to the institution of language and law. The maternal chora is figured as that which invisibly underwrites what will be understood as the law of the father—a law that is said to mark the inauguration of language. But if the law of the father is rational and semantic, the maternal should not be conceived as simply irrational and pure sound. For Cavarero, the maternal vocalic demonstrates its own reason through its rhythmic and musical resonance... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MACINTYRE'S REPUBLIC J. K. SWINDLER Westminster College Fulton, Missouri CONTRARY TO HIS own evident intentions and perceptions, in After Virtue A'lasdair Macinty!l.·e is much more of a Ptlatonist 1than the A1 ristotelian he aims to be. I hase this judgment both on the positive evidence that Macintyre and Plato (in the Republic) m1gue for and against the same crucial theses and on the negative evidence that Plato has read (...) answers to the very issues which Macintyre finds 1 intractable from an AristoteHan point of viiew. My thesis can be made out in terms of a half dozen issues which Maclntyire takes as crucial to his case: (1) Can there he a science of government? (2) Is there an answer to the sophist's chaillenge to morality? (3) How oan the fragmentation of the modern self he theoretically overcome? (4) What are the hi1stocical and social determinants of morality? (5) Is there a unity of virtue in addition to individual virtues? (6) Can we reconcile ourselves to teleofogy, the absence of the polis, and the tragedy of human 1:ife? I will consider each of these in turn. I. Wisdom Plato defines wisdom as knowledge of how to rule, and Aristotle (in the Nichomachean Ethics) distinguishes between theoretical and practical wisdom, 1suggesting thereby an interesting ambiguity in Plato's view, an ambiguity of which Macintyre makes a great deal. One may rule eithecr hy law or by judgment. In his attack on the Enlightenment, MacIntyre showis quite clearly tha;t the idea of a social science that would p11ovide laws of human behavior, which could in 343 344 J. K. SWINDLER turn be used by il"ulers and managers to predict and therefore manipulate!human action, was an invention of the eighteenth century. He offers an extensive 1oritique o.f this conception of socirul science, grounded primarily in the claim that human.behavior is essentially unlawful, at least if we judge it by the standards of the physical sciences. There is in human affairs a farge 1and uneliminwble element of fortiuna which makes it impossrible rto.formulate laws of human nature or behavior that would he exceptionless and therefore underwrite predictions of behavior. For there is nothing to be done about the unpredictability of innovations or, from one's own point of view, of one's own future actions; nor can the uncertainties of gametheoretie decisions and 1 the general contingency of the outcomes of ruction,be remedied. There is therefore no possibility of a social science in the sense in which Hume tried to imitate Newton. So much for Marx and Weber and the horde of modern.social scientists. This is not to say that life is completely uncertain; on the contrary, there are genuine and general regularities in society, some natural, some social, ·some statistical, some causal, wihich make life bearable. But these provide a,ground for the Aristotelian idea, endorsed by MacIntyre, that the principles of conduct, such as they might be, hold only for the most part and not universa1ly. There is therefore in Maclntyre's view no justification for 1a mora;l oode in the modern sense, nor ev;en of moral principles of the kind we are used to from Kant ·and Mill, Rawls and Nozick, which purport to istand as a sufficient criterion of right in all cases. But, importantly, we do not find any such rules or codes in Pla.to either. For Plato, too, insists on the mixed reign of chaos and logos in the materia;l world and in our Jives and concludes that judgment is essential to· determining right conduct. He tellrs us that wise rule comes only &om good oharructer and good institutions, that legislating in such detaii1 as to eliminate judgment is "cut:ting off the heads of a hy:dra." One cannot help hut think that tMs (essentially Hemclitean) point is something Aristotle ~earned at his MACINTYRE'S REPUBLIC 345 master's knee. And both aspects of Plato's :point ~e ipresent in Aristotle, viz., that s~nce the:ve is chance in nature, there is luck (good 'and had) in life, and since no rule can capture the particularity of conorete situations right... (shrink)

The author traces the development of the concept of an empirical scientific theory from pre-critical thought through Aristotle. Parmenides is credited with recognizing the distinction between abstract concepts and the empirical world. Zeno's paradoxes and the skepticism of the sophists are seen not only as the two major obstacles to any empirical theory but also as containing implicitly the criteria of a theory, i.e., that it must not lead to paradoxes, and that it be objectively true. Plato, in his (...) Sophist, proves that an empirical theory is possible by resolving the paradoxes and by refuting the sophists' claim that false belief is impossible. The second part of Plato's Parmenides is seen as an attempt to present and evaluate alternative "structures of the world". Finally, the author discusses Aristotle's Physics as a thoroughly worked out theory. The author's frequent use of the technical terminology of contemporary philosophy of science helps him to bring these ancient works up to date, but also yields interpretations which are anachronistic. The book is original and often insightful.—R. J. K. (shrink)

The introduction gives a brief but very useful account of the life and works of Aquinas. The Dictionary is planned as a handbook for modern students on the model of the Plato Dictionary and the Aristotle Dictionary and concentrates on the interests of modern studies in philosophy and theology. Hence terms like Analogy of Being, Participation, Act, Potency, Matter, Form, Person, Individuation, and the other central notions of Thomistic Philosophy receive scant treatment. Similarly theological terms like Incarnation, Trinity, Redemption, (...) and Supernatural are omitted. But it contains an impressive number of entries most of which get several important text references from the works of St. Thomas.—J. K. (shrink)

The metaphor is derived from archery. The epithet πτερόες is appropriate to arrows [πτερόεντες ỏịστοί E 171, ỉờν βλτα πτερόεντα Δ 117, οì πτερόεντες π 773, πτερόεντα 68]. Just as πτερόεντα means ‘feathered arrows,’ so πεα πτερόεντα means ‘feathered words.’ The early Greeks, when they formed a picture of words in their minds, thought of them as missiles—not as birds. Whence ‘to utter’ words is ένα or ένα. Missiles so light are more readily imagined as arrows than as spears or (...) stones. (shrink)

Aristotle and the sea battle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--Aristotle's different possibilities, by K. J. J. Hintikka.--On Aristotle's square of opposition, by M. Thompson.--Categories in Aristotle and in Kant, by J. C. Wilson.--Aristotle's Categories, chapters I-V: translation and notes, by J. L. Ackrill--Aristotle's theory of categories, by J. M. E. Moravcsik.--Essence and accident, by I. M. Copi.--Tithenai ta phainomena, by G. E. L. Owen.--Matter and predication in Aristotle, by J. Owens.--Problems in Metaphysics Z, (...) chapter 13, by M. J. Woods.--The meaning of agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, by H. A. Prichard.--Agathon and eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle, by J. L. Austin.--The final good in Aristotle's Ethics, by W. F. R. Hardie.--Aristotle on pleasure, by J. O. Urmson.--Bibliography (p. 335-41). (shrink)

This is the first work on Campanella's philosophy to appear in English. In it the author presents a detailed analysis of Campanella's theory of knowledge, metaphysics, treatise on God, and moral and political doctrines, and evaluates each position in relation to medieval and renaissance thought. The study opens with a survey of Italian renaissance philosophy and a report on Campanella's life and historical position and concludes with an assessment of Campanella's system and an exceptionally thorough bibliography. A chief concern of (...) Professor Bonansea in the preparation of his work has been to support each statement with Campanella's own words or references to one or more primary sources. This exacting method has the double advantages of assuring the reader of a faithful rendering of Campanella's thought and of acquainting him with original material not easily available. In certain areas the inquiry has led to conclusions that conflict with those of various earlier writers who were unable to use all the primary sources now accessible or were too hasty in their judgments. Thus a more thorough study reveals that while Campanella, especially in his earlier writings, subscribed in some degree to naturalistic doctrines then current, he never rejected any of the basic truths of the Christian faith. However it would be wrong, Professor Bonansea points out, to call Campanella a genuine representative of traditional scholastic philosophy. He does not conform to the Thomistic school, which he blames on many counts for betraying Aquinas' thought and for its close adherence to the philosophy of Aristotle. Nor does he belong, properly speaking, to the Augustinian school, although this latter greatly contributed to the shaping of his thought. Campanella's doctrine is truly syncretic. In it elements of different schools of philosophy are fused to produce a unique and original synthesis, with principles drawn mainly from Augustinian, Thomistic, and naturalistic streams of thought. Bonansea's volume is the product of many years of research and shows itself to be a clear, solid, and comprehensive study of Campanella's many-sided thought. Its combination of fresh and independent judgment and thorough documentation make this a work of unique authority and value.--J. K. R. (shrink)

We would like to thank Dolega and Dewhurst for a thought-provoking and informed deconstruction of our article, which we take as applause from valued members of our audience. In brief, we fully concur with the theatre-free formulation offered by Dolega and Dewhurst and take the opportunity to explain why we used the Cartesian theatre metaphor. We do this by drawing an analogy between consciousness and evolution. This analogy is used to emphasize the circular causality inherent in the free energy principle. (...) We conclude with a comment on the special forms of active inference that may be associated with selfawareness and how they may be especially informed by dream states. (shrink)

Aristotle and the sea battle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--Aristotle's different possibilities, by K. J. J. Hintikka.--On Aristotle's square of opposition, by M. Thompson.--Categories in Aristotle and in Kant, by J. C. Wilson.--Aristotle's Categories, chapters I-V: translation and notes, by J. L. Ackrill.--Aristotle's theory of categories, by J. M. E. Moravcsik.--Essence and accident, by I. M. Copi.--Tithenai ta phainomena, by G. E. L. Owen.--Matter and predication in Aristotle, by J. Owens.--Problems in Metaphysics Z, (...) chapter 13, by M. J. Woods.--The meaning of agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, by H. A. Prichard.--Agathon and eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle, by J. L. Austin.--The final good in Aristotle's Ethics, by W. F. R. Hardie.--Aristotle on pleasure, by J. O. Urmson.--Bibliography (p. 335-341). (shrink)

Earp, Lewis, and Hart make a comprehensive and compelling argument for ending the “war on drugs,” highlighting the importance of both ending the criminalization of people who use drugs, and...

Recent data indicate that under a specific posthypnotic suggestion to circumvent reading, highly suggestible subjects successfully eliminated the Stroop interference effect. The present study examined whether an optical explanation could account for this finding. Using cyclopentolate hydrochloride eye drops to pharmacologically prevent visual accommodation in all subjects, behavioral Stroop data were collected from six highly hypnotizables and six less suggestibles using an optical setup that guaranteed either sharply focused or blurred vision. The highly suggestibles performed the Stroop task when naturally (...) vigilant, under posthypnotic suggestion not to read, and while visually blurred; the less suggestibles ran naturally vigilant, while looking away, and while visually blurred. Although visual accommodation was precluded for all subjects, posthypnotic suggestion effectively eliminated Stroop interference and was comparable to looking away in controls. These data strengthen the view that Stroop interference is neither robust nor inevitable and support the hypothesis that posthypnotic suggestion may exert a top-down influence on neural processing. (shrink)

We present the opinion of some authors who believe there is no force between a stationary charge and a stationary resistive wire carrying a constant current. We show that this force is different from zero and present its main components: the force due to the charges induced in the wire by the test charge and a force proportional to the current in the resistive wire. We also discuss briefly a component of the force proportional to the square of the current (...) which should exist according to some models and another component due to the acceleration of the conduction electrons in a curved wire carrying a dc current (centripetal acceleration). Finally, we analyze experiments showing the existence of the electric field proportional to the current in resistive wires. (shrink)

In this work we analyze the case of resistive conductor plates carrying constant currents, utilizing surface charge distributions. We obtain the electric potential in the plates and in the space surrounding them. We obtain a non-vanishing electric field outside the conductors. We compare the theoretical results with experimental data present in the literature.

v. 1. Nicomachean ethics. Politics. The Athenian Constitution. Rhetoric. On Poetics.--v. 2. Logic.--v. 3. Physics. Metaphysics. On the soul. Short physical treaties.--v. 4. On the heavens. On generation and corruption. Meteorology. Biological treatises.

Two particular forms of absolute space-time theories are examined. There follows a derivation of their predictions for measurements that are within present-day detection limits.

We give in this paper a sufficient condition, cast in semantic terms, for Hallden-completeness in normal modal logics, a modal logic being said to be Hallden-complete (or Ήallden-reasonable') just in case for any disjunctive formula provable in the logic, where the disjuncts have no propositional variables in common, one or other of those disjuncts is provable in the logic.